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“Seeing oneself through the eyes of others. 







Ansgar Beckermanns Theorie zur Erklärung von Selbstbewusstsein kann als exemplarischer 
Versuch verstanden werden, die Wurzeln selbstbewusster Zustände in sozialer Kognition zu 
suchen. Dabei wird angenommen, dass eine notwendige Bedingung zur Entwicklung von 
Selbstbewusstsein darin besteht, dass sich kognitive Wesen in sozialer Interaktion ‚mit den 
Augen eines anderen sehen‘ lernen. Dieser Ansatz scheitert aber aus prinzipiellen Gründen, 
da er die besondere, identifikationsfreie Referenz von Ich-Gedanken nicht erklären kann und 
damit eine Erklärung wesentlicher Züge von de-se-Zuständen schuldig bleibt. Zudem ist Be-




Ansgar Beckermann’s account of self-consciousness can be seen as an attempt to locate the 
origin of self-conscious states in social cognition. It is assumed that in order to acquire self-
consciousness, a cognitive system has to ‘see itself through the eyes of the others’. This ac-
count, however, is doomed to failure, for principled reasons. It cannot provide a satisfactory 
explanation of the special, identification-free reference of first-person thoughts and, thus, fails 
to explain crucial features of de-se attitudes. In addition, Beckermann’s account exhibits vari-












“Seeing oneself through the eyes of others. 






Our primary goal in this paper is to describe and criticize a certain approach to self-
consciousness which takes self-consciousness to originate in social cognition. As a paradig-
matic and particularly clear example of this approach we take Ansgar Beckermann’s specific 
account of self-consciousness (Beckermann 2008 and Beckermann 2003). According to 
Beckermann, the ability to think of oneself as oneself, constitutive of self-consciousness, aris-
es from the task of representing the contents of others’ mental states – as (sometimes) con-
cerning oneself.   
The first part of our paper summarizes Beckermann’s account of self-consciousness 
(section 2). The rest of the paper is dedicated to a critique of this account. Some not too seri-
ous problems with the proposal are briefly mentioned and put to one side (section 3). These 
problems concern certain aspects of Beckermann’s proposal which are of a quite general na-
ture, like the notions of computational and causal role and the conceptual and indexical char-
acter of first-person states. Even if Beckermann could deal successfully with these problems, 
however, serious problems concerning directly the nature of self-consciousness would remain. 
These problems constitute the main difficulty for Beckermann’s account, and we will discuss 
them in detail (section 4). The main difficulty is a generic problem for any ‘social’ account of 
self-consciousness: it cannot explain the peculiar de-se character of self-conscious states, 
since it cannot explain the peculiar reference of the first-person concept that is immune to 
error through misidentification.  
 
 
2. Beckermann’s account of de-se states 
 
Let us begin with an overview of Beckermann’s theory of self-consciousness which can count 
as a paradigmatic example of the approach towards an explanation of self-consciousness via 
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social cognition.1 To illustrate his account, Beckermann tells a story of a cognitive system, 
called ‘Al’. Although one could get the impression that Beckermann takes this story to be a 
real account of the ontogenetic development of self-representations and self-consciousness, 
we think one should take it merely as a metaphor or illustration which is meant to describe 
various forms of self-knowledge and their natures, functions, and limitations. Accordingly, we 
will describe his story not as a series of developmental steps of one organism, but we will 
carve out and present the central claims of the view standing behind the story.2 
Beckermann starts by noting that only entities that form representations of their envi-
ronment are capable of having self-representations. This means that simpler organisms that 
admittedly can experience their environment and behave in it but do not form representa-
tions,3 are per se not capable of forming self-representations. An example would be a system 
whose behavior rests exclusively on stimulus-response-mechanisms.4  
Organisms that form representations of their environment are termed ‘cognitive systems’ 
by Beckermann. Drawing on John Perry’s work,5 he claims that cognitive systems represent 
objects in their vicinity as standing in certain spatial and other relations to themselves due to 
the agent-relative roles these objects play with regard to them.6 This means that cognitive sys-
tems do not represent the objects in their environment in some kind of universal coordinate 
system as, e.g., the AI-program SHRDLU does. Instead, they represent objects in an egocen-
                                                            
1 Another example for this kind of approach is Musholt (2012). Tugendhat (1979) is sometimes interpreted as 
belonging to this approach, but he has rejected this interpretation (Tugendhat 2005). Of course, the approach 
goes back to, or is inspired by, George Herbert Mead’s philosophy, and it is manifest in Jürgen Habermas’ work, 
in one way or another. 
2 To give just one example of a question that would have to be addressed in a genuine, serious account of the 
ontogenetic development of self-consciousness: How can an organism that has absolutely no conception of itself 
come to represent that another subject is looking at it, or wants to interact with it? At least some rudimentary 
form of self-representation seems to be required. In general, Beckermann’s story is rather a theory of the nature 
and function of self-consciousness than a developmental theory. 
3 Beckermann identifies representations as “more or less stable internal structures, that stand for some aspects of 
the environment, even if they are not currently experienced.” Beckermann (2008, 69). (Our translation.) 
4 Beckermann gives as examples the crab that Churchland uses to illustrate eye-arm-coordination in Churchland 
(1986, 284), and the program SHRDLU, designed by Terry Winograd. Cf. Beckermann (2008, 68) and Becker-
mann (2003, 176), respectively. 
5 Especially Perry (1998). 
6 In Perry’s terms, agent-relative roles of objects determine epistemic and pragmatic methods that are appropriate 
to get to know of or act on them, respectively. See Perry (1998, 84), and Perry (2002, 197ff.) (Here, his termi-
nology has changed from ‘agent-relative roles’ to ‘agent-relative relations’.) 
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tric frame of reference. One might think that this mode of representation presupposes some 
kind of self-representation, but Beckermann explicitly denies this claim by stating that in or-
der to egocentrically represent objects around oneself one merely has to represent the property 
of standing-in-a-certain-relation-to-oneself. No explicit self-representation is contained.7 The 
relevant properties are agent-relative properties, and one can represent them ‘en bloc’, as it 
were. The same holds true of the case of representations of the cognitive system itself: it is 
possible to represent internal states of the representing system without explicitly representing 
the system as such. According to Beckermann (and Perry, too), the reason for this is simply 
the fact that the kinds of representations that figured hitherto in the discussion – egocen-
tric/agent-relative representations of the environment and proprioceptive representations – 
share the property that every token of them always concerns one and the same cognitive sys-
tem, namely, the one that these representations belong to. It will never be the case that a par-
ticular cognitive system represents objects in its environment as standing in a relation to a 
cognitive system other than itself when engaged in egocentric perception; equally, it will nev-
er be the case that a cognitive system represents internal states of some other cognitive system 
when engaged in proprioception. Nevertheless, such representations amount to a kind of self-
knowledge in that they implicitly purport to carry information about the spatial relations the 
representing system bears to the represented objects and about the internal states that are actu-
ally instantiated in the representing system. For that reason, Perry calls such knowledge 
‘agent-relative knowledge’. 
By now, we have an organism which is capable of perceiving, and behaving in, its envi-
ronment by means of its agent-relative knowledge. No explicit self-representation – i.e., no 
representation of the representing system itself – is needed for these purposes. But the world 
does not only contain dead objects but other cognitive systems as well. Hence, it is very im-
portant for each cognitive system to know what the others are going to do, and whether they 
are friendly or hostile against oneself, in order to act appropriately. This is why cognitive sys-
tems not only represent objects and their properties but other cognitive systems and their men-
tal states as well. In other words, cognitive systems are capable of meta-representations, i.e., 
representations of representations. The next step is a crucial one: in order to represent repre-
sentations of others which have as their content the representing system itself, the represent-
ing system has to represent itself. That’s where a self-representation comes into play. This 
                                                            
7 This claim, although not questioned by Beckermann, is not entirely uncontroversial. For there are accounts that 
presume some form of self-representation even in egocentric representations of the environment, see e.g. Schel-
lenberg (2007) and, less clearly though, Brewer (1992). 
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self-representation is the core representation of a fully self-conscious system. Henceforth, it is 
not only used to represent others’ representations of oneself, but also to represent one’s own 
physical and mental properties and to develop a body schema.8  
But what exactly makes this self-representation a self-conscious representation of one-
self, i.e., a de se-representation? All we have so far is a representation of a particular cognitive 
system that happens to be of the cognitive system itself. Now Beckermann claims that exactly 
those self-representations count as de se which are equivalent to the agent-relative representa-
tions the organism uses to orient in and interact with its environment. Equivalence in this case 
means having the same computational role.9 This has two decisive consequences. Firstly, 
proprioceptive input leads not only to agent-relative representations but to explicit self-
representations as well. Secondly, explicit self-representations inherit two futures of agent-
relative representations concerning actions. The first feature is that in particular situations, 
representations with agent-relative content immediately lead to certain actions, typically. Rep-
resentations that contain explicit reference to the representing system are then supposed to 
have the same immediate impact on action. For example, when a ball is flying in one’s direc-
tion, one will immediately try to catch it or to avoid being hit by it, typically. This will be the 
case no matter whether one represents merely the agent-relative roles of the ball or whether 
one explicitly engages in self-conscious representation.  
The second feature is that both types of representations are connected with certain bodi-
ly movements that constitute certain types of actions. That is, to represent in an agent-relative 
manner some object of one’s vicinity means directly to know how to move one’s body in or-
der to interact with that object. This feature is also supposed to be transferred to the corre-
sponding self-conscious representations.  
With these two features inherited from agent-relative representations, self-
representations play a special role among all representations of a cognitive system, according 
to Beckermann. The special role lies exactly in the action-related consequences those self-
conscious representations have. As an illustration Beckermann cites Perry’s famous example 
of a supermarket shopper who follows a sugar trail, trying to tell the owner of the damaged 
sugar package that he is making a mess and not realizing that he himself is the one with the 
damaged package. When he finally realizes his fault, his actions concerning ‘the owner of the 
damaged sugar package’ change significantly.10  
                                                            
8 Beckermann (2003, 183f.).  
9 Beckermann (2003, 186). 
10 Perry (1993, 33). 
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To sum up Beckermann’s account, one can say that de-se representations have the fol-
lowing distinguishing marks: they are used to represent others’ representations of oneself and 
one’s own physical and mental states, and they have an immediate significance for action due 
to their equivalence with agent-relative representations. In Beckermann’s words: “[D]e se 
beliefs […] are characterized by the specific causal role they play within the cognitive system 
of a person and with regard to her or his actions.”11 
 
 
3. Problems with Beckermann’s account 
 
In this section we will briefly note several problems for Beckermann’s account. These con-
cern certain aspects that are usually associated with self-conscious states in the philosophical 
debate. We will mention four problems: the issue of indexicality, a problem concerning caus-
al-computational role and Beckermann’s thesis of ‘equivalence’, the issue of the conceptual 
character of self-consciousness, and the issue of the identity of the first-person concept (over 
time). We think that these four issues raise serious questions and problems, but we put them 
to one side. The main purpose of this section is to prepare the ground for presenting the real, 
fundamental difficulty, by setting it apart from the four issues just mentioned. The fundamen-
tal difficulty with Beckermann’s account (and, indeed, any ‘social’ account of self-
consciousness) will be presented in the next section. 
A first question concerns the indexicality of the first-person concept. Beckermann relies 
heavily on ideas of John Perry concerning different types of ‘self-related knowledge.’ He in-
corporates in his story the notions of knowledge of the person one happens to be, agent-
relative knowledge and self-attached knowledge, the fundamental triad in Perry’s work. But 
regarding another central claim of Perry’s, namely the essential indexicality of the first-person 
concept, Beckermann does not say a word. Perry claims that some indexical expressions, 
namely, those that express ‘locating beliefs’ about who one is, which time it is, and where one 
is, are not substitutable by other (non-indexical) expressions without loss of explanatory 
force.12 It’s not clear whether Beckermann regards this feature of ‘I’ as non-essential as, e.g., 
Ruth Millikan does,13 or whether he thinks that in his tale about the genesis of self-
representations the indexicality is somehow incorporated into his account. The first interpreta-
                                                            
11 Beckermann (2003, 186). 
12 Perry (1993). 
13 Millikan (1990). 
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tion is supported by the fact that he claims that all objects, including the representing system 
itself, are represented by internal ‘names,’ which by definition are not indexical expressions, 
we take it. But the second interpretation seems plausible as well, since Beckermann claims 
that Al would express representations that are about itself by the indexical ‘I.’14  
A second issue concerns causal-computational role and Beckermann’s ‘equivalence the-
sis’. A central element in Beckermann’s account is the notion of a ‘role’ a representation has. 
On the one hand, there is the special computational role that the self-representation has.15 On 
the other hand, there is its special causal role.16 The causal role consists in the special, unme-
diated action-relevance that agent-relative representations have and that is inherited by the 
self-representation via its equivalence with agent-relative representations. This sounds quite 
right, and it is widely accepted that de se-representations have this kind of action-relevance. 
But the problem with Beckermann’s account regarding this point is twofold. Firstly, he gives 
no explanation of the unmediated action-relevance of agent-relative representations, he only 
states this supposed fact by re-telling some examples from Perry. These examples in turn rely 
on the unargued assumption that Fregean modes of presentation can be interpreted as causal 
roles. Even if this is the case, neither Beckermann nor Perry provides any explanation of it. 
The second problem lies in the postulated equivalence between agent-relative representations 
and self-representations. Even if we take it for granted that agent-relative representations have 
this special causal role, Beckermann does not put forward anything which could make it intel-
ligible that self-representations inherit this role – he merely postulates this. To give some evi-
dence how this might happen, Beckermann should have presented (within his story) a some-
what more detailed account of how the equivalence between agent-relative representations 
and self-representations evolves. But he only states that it does evolve.  
It seems, though, that the causal role is dependent on the computational role a represen-
tation has in the cognitive architecture of a cognitive system. Beckermann states that the caus-
al role is a ‘consequence’ of the equivalence between agent-relative and self-representations, 
and he writes that “‘being equivalent’ here mean[s] simply ‘having the same computational 
role’”.17 
So, perhaps we just have to look at the computational roles of these representations. Un-
fortunately, the situation here is the same, if not worse. The computational role is explained 
                                                            
14 Beckermann (2003, 184). 
15 Beckermann (2003, 186); Beckermann (2008, 77f.). 
16 Beckermann (2003, 186f.); Beckermann (2008, 79ff.). 
17 Beckermann (2003, 186). 
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by Beckermann in terms of ‘modes of presentation’ or Fregean contents: representations with 
the same mode of presentation/Fregean content correspond to the same computational role.18 
Hence, self-representations have a special mode of presentation, which Beckermann calls 
“EGO-mode of presentation”.19 But Beckermann does not tell us more about it, except that it 
is a “very special way”20 in which one is given to oneself. Furthermore, Beckermann states 
that the computational role of self-representations has two special features. The second feature 
is the peculiar causal role we already encountered. The first feature is that the proprioceptive 
input is not only represented in terms of agent-relative representations but also explicitly in 
terms of self-representations. Hence, it seems that the computational role of self-
representations is simply special because proprioceptive input is related to them and they have 
a close connection to action. But if we take Beckermann literally, even these features are not 
peculiar to self-representations, since agent-relative representations have exactly the same 
properties. For, the equivalence between the two ensures that they have the same computa-
tional role.  
A third problem with Beckermann’s account concerns the conceptual character of self-
representation. Beckermann writes that only “self-knowledge in a strong sense” requires that 
the cognitive system develops a concept of itself.21This seems to imply that the self-
representation is a concept. But Beckermann does not say anything about the consequences 
that being a concept could have for the self-representation. Instead, he claims that conceptual 
self-representations and agent-relative representations, which form a kind of self-knowledge 
that is not dependent on a concept of oneself, are very similar in that they have the same com-
putational roles. 22 Does this mean that there exist non-conceptual and conceptual forms of 
self-consciousness side by side? Or is only the second kind a kind of self-consciousness? 
Does the difference between the two only consist in that the second one refers explicitly to the 
representing system while the first one does so only tacitly or implicitly? If that is the only 
difference, wouldn’t that mean that conceptual and non-conceptual representations of particu-
lar things are only different in their degree of explicitness? Beckermann does not say anything 
that could give us an answer to these questions.  
                                                            
18 Beckermann (2003, 185). 
19 Beckermann (2003, 185). 
20 Beckermann (2003, 185). 
21 Beckermann (2008, 75). 
22 Cf. Beckermann (2008, 75). 
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Another point relating to the issue of conceptual character is the question of the identity 
of the self-representation. Beckermann claims that the first-person concept develops from the 
social interaction and the need for meta-representations of others’ mental states coming with it. 
Hence, at the beginning we have a self-representation that has a specific role among the repre-
sentations of a cognitive system, namely, to represent oneself as one figures in mental states 
of others. But later, it will have the computational role mentioned above. It seems that im-
portant features of the first-person concept have changed, and one could wonder whether the 
first-person concept before the development is the same concept as the concept after it. Be-
cause one could argue that concepts are (partly) defined by their computational role, it seems 
at least doubtful that this is the case. Unless Beckermann gives an argument in favor of the 
identity of the relevant concept over time, the story might seem incoherent.23  
 
 
4. The fundamental difficulty with Beckermann’s theory  
 
Aside from the problems just mentioned we think that the fundamental difficulty with Beck-
ermann’s account – and with the entire ‘social approach’ to self-consciousness – resides in the 
fact that it cannot explain the peculiar de-se character of self-conscious representations. The 
means available to Beckermann are not suitable for the task of explaining the de-se character 
of self-representations. (This problem, we submit, is generic to the entire ‘social approach’ to 
self-consciousness, and not just a problem for Beckermann’s specific version.) One cannot 
explain the de-se character of self-conscious states by reference to a role in social metacogni-
tion. This is what we would like to argue in the remainder of this paper. 
The fundamental difficulty relates to two important features of self-consciousness: its 
reference and its immunity. Let us explain. The first-person concept refers, we take it, pace 
Anscombe. It is self-referential, in the sense of referring to the subject. For example, Al’s 
first-person concept refers to Al. (Self-referentiality in this sense is simply reflexivity, and 
does not require or involve any de-se mode of presentation.) But the first-person concept re-
fers in a special way. It refers in a way which allows for representations which are immune to 
                                                            
23 Originalism about concept identity, as recently proposed by Sainsbury, Tye (2011), would be a view of con-
cepts that is favorable to Beckermann’s theory. Originalism allows for changes in semantic features and/or com-
putational roles, without loss of identity of the concept. Other views of concepts that individuate concepts se-




error through misidentification with respect to the first person. For the sake of brevity, let us 
call this feature ‘immunity’. Immunity in this sense lies at the heart of the special de-se char-
acter of self-conscious states. Indeed, one can take it as the crucial criterion for self-
consciousness. The debate about self-consciousness has focused on immunity ever since 
Strawsons’s, Shoemaker’s, and Evans’ works. We will follow their lead here. So let us sup-
pose that what needs to be explained about the first-person concept is its reference and im-
munity.24 
The crucial question now is whether Beckermann’s account can explain the reference 
and immunity of the first-person concept. In the following we would like to argue that the 
answer is negative. Beckermann’s account lacks the resources for such an explanation. We 
take this as a sufficient reason for concluding that his account cannot explain self-
consciousness, since reference and immunity are the crucial features of self-consciousness in 
need of explanation.  
Let us begin by taking a closer look at immunity. Roughly, a first-person representation 
is immune (with respect to the first-person position)25 just in case it is impossible that it is 
false because, and only because, the subject represents of someone that something is true of 
that person, but fails to identify that person with herself.26 For example, the first-person repre-
sentation whose content can be expressed by the utterance ‘I see a pink elephant’ can be false 
because the elephant I am currently seeing is in fact grey, but it cannot be false because it is in 
fact you who sees the elephant but not me (at least, normally). Hence, this representation is 
immune to an error on the ground that I misidentify someone seeing an elephant with me. 
Whether the representation is immune or not is not determined by the object the judgment 
refers to, but by the kind of information that grounds the judgment (that is, the way in which 
the judgment is arrived at).27 The best characterization of immunity is given by identification-
freedom. Because I do not identify myself, there is no possibility of mis-identification. This is 
why I cannot misidentify someone else as me. Immune first-person representations are identi-
                                                            
24 Bermúdez (2011) takes immunity (in this sense) as definitive of self-consciousness. We take it that immunity 
is a necessary condition, not a sufficient condition. 
25 Strictly speaking, immunity is always relative to a certain position. For the sake of brevity, we will not always 
mention this qualification in the following. The context should make things clear enough. 
26 Shoemaker develops this property with reference to Wittgenstein in Shoemaker (1968). 
27 Cf. Gertler (2011, 216); Evans (1982, 218f.). With regard to the first-person concept this characterization im-
plies that not every judgment involving it is immune to such an error. And in general, other judgments concern-
ing particular things (de re-judgments) can be immune in that sense, too. See Gertler (2011, 216) and Evans 
(1982, 219) for examples. 
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fication-free. Reference to myself is not mediated by any detection of identifying properties, 
i.e., it is not mediated by any identification of myself.28 
Immunity can be spelled out in detail in various different ways. But what we will argue 
will not depend on which of these various more precise statements of immunity one favors. 
The crucial feature of immunity, for our purposes, is identification-freedom. This is, more or 
less, Evans’ understanding of the phenomenon.29 And from now on, we will rely on this basic 
understanding. Our argument will be independent of any further details.30 
Let us now consider the issue of reference, and the explanation of reference, of the first-
person concept. For many philosophers, the first-person concept is referential, i.e., each token 
refers to a certain individual (namely, the one which is exercising the first-person concept on 
that occasion). Famously, Elisabeth Anscombe has denied that the first-person concept re-
fers.31 But it seems fair to say that her view is rather an implausible position, and there are not 
many who have followed her. Now, let us suppose that the first-person concept is a referential 
representation. (And clearly, Beckermann agrees.) This raises the question how we can ex-
plain its reference. Following Reichenbach, we can say that the token-indexical rule describes 
the reference of the first-person concept: any token of the first-person concept, occurring 
within the thought t, refers to the thinker of this thought t. This, however, does not provide an 
explanation of why a token of the first-person concept refers to the subject to which it in fact 
refers. And one can wonder whether it is not an important theoretical task to illuminate and 
explain how the first-person concept refers.  
                                                            
28 Here we want to point out that we distinguish between referring to oneself and identifying oneself. So refer-
ring to oneself is not per se an identification of oneself. Identification requires the detection of some property, or 
cluster of properties, sufficiently rich for determining the referent. Reference to oneself is possible without the 
detection of such a property, or cluster of properties. This is one of the lessons we take from Shoemaker. Note, 
furthermore, that the property, or cluster of properties, used for identification can contain indexical-
demonstrative elements. (Récanati, 2007, uses ‘identification’ and ‘articulation’ more or less synonymously. Cf. 
ibid., 147, e.g. In this sense, then, reference is also to be distinguished from articulation.) 
29 Cf. Evans (1982, 180f.). 
30 Perhaps, one should distinguish between ‘absolute’ and ‘circumstantial immunity’, as Shoemaker (1968) does. 
(Récanati thinks that Shoemaker is confused here. Cf. Récanati, 2007, ch. 20.) And perhaps, immunity can be 
extended to the predicative position, as Bar-On (2004) suggest. Since we are interested only in the first-person 
concept, we will ignore any such extension. For further refinements and discussions of immunity see, for exam-
ple, Pryor (1999), Coliva (2006), Récanati (2007). For our purposes, the basic understanding of immunity as 
identification-free reference and self-knowledge is sufficient. 
31 Cf. Anscombe (1975). 
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If we take together these two features of the first-person concept, its reference and its 
immunity, it seems quite clear that in principle, an explanation of reference could be given by 
recourse to the causal-computational role – and, indeed, an explanation which is perfectly in 
line with immunity. The basic idea for such an explanation is the special causal-computational 
role that the first-person concept has in relation to egocentric perception and proprioception. 
The first-person concept is tied immediately (i.e., without any mediation by identifying prop-
erties) to proprioceptive experiences that represent the subject’s bodily states. If, for example, 
Al feels pain in his left knee, Al is inclined to immediately form the first-person representa-
tion ‘Al feels pain in his left knee.’ (This is so if Al’s internal name ‘Al’ really is a first-
person representation.) Similarly, ‘Al’ is immediately linked to egocentric contents in Al’s 
perceptual experience. If Al’s perceptual state represents a tree-in-front-of-Al, then Al is in-
clined to immediately form the first-person representation ‘A tree is in front of Al.’ Proprio-
ception and egocentric perception provide information about Al to which Al’s first-person 
concept is sensitive without the help of any mediating identification. Now, plausibly, because 
the information is always about Al, this concept refers to Al. As Beckermann emphasizes, 
proprioception and egocentric perception always provide information about one and the same 
object, namely, the cognitive system itself (Al). And this is why no identification is required. 
If – perhaps per impossibile – proprioception could sometimes concern some other cognitive 
system, identification would become necessary. Only because there is no such variation in the 
object of proprioception, identification is superfluous. We have a kind of (structural, non-
accidental) ‘informational constancy’ which makes identification superfluous. (Similarly, 
egocentric content always relates things to one and the same cognitive system, Al.) As Ré-
canati nicely puts it: “The subject himself does not need to be explicitly represented, since the 
representation can only be about him and his situation.”32 The concept that Al acquires on the 
basis of proprioception and egocentric perception allows for immune self-representations, 
since it refers to Al and does so without any identification of Al (i.e., without the need for any 
uniquely identifying descriptive content).  
We can generalize the result. Whenever a system has a set of representational states that 
always concern the system itself – which exhibits informational constancy –, it seems possible 
to ‘introduce’ a concept of the system which allows for immune self-representation. By its 
causal-computational role, this concept is sensitive to these representational states, and it can 
refer without identification.  
                                                            
32 Récanati (2007, 146). Here, Récanati echoes Perry’s talk of ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit representation’. Perry also 
speaks of the subject’s being an ‘unarticulated constituent’ of the representation. Cf. Perry (1986). 
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By now, surely we do not yet have a full-blown explanation of reference and immunity. 
But at least, we have an idea and a sketch of such an explanation. And it does not seem hope-
less to think that the searched-for explanation could be given along these lines. So we have 
reason to assume that this is the right track for explaining reference and immunity. 
This raises a problem for Beckermann’s account. According to Beckermann, the origin 
of Al’s first-person concept is social metacognition. The primary job of the first-person con-
cept is to represent Al as occurring in the contents of others’ representations. Now, it may be 
the case that the first-person concept performs this job. But does this help to explain its crucial 
features, reference and immunity? On reflection, the answer is negative. It seems hopeless to 
try to understand reference and immunity by looking at the role of the first-person concept in 
social metacognition. The reason for this is simply the fact that there is no informational con-
stancy to be found here – in contrast to the just-mentioned explanation in terms of propriocep-
tion and egocentric perception. Others do not always represent Al, they represent other con-
specifics as well. Probably, they will represent Al only in a minor fraction of all cases. So 
there is not even any approximation of informational constancy. Al has to find out whether 
another cognitive system represents Al or some other, third cognitive system. It would be 
wildly incorrect to assume (by default) that others always represent Al. Therefore, the explan-
atory idea just mentioned cannot be transferred to, or mirrored within, the social metacogni-
tion account. Something else needs to be provided as an explanation of reference and immuni-
ty, and it is hard to see what could do the job. At least, Beckermann does not provide it, and 
we cannot even see any hint in his account.  
Beckermann holds that Al’s internal name of Al comes to acquire a certain causal-
computational role (the one he tries to describe by speaking of ‘equivalence’). The alleged 
‘equivalence’ between Al’s internal name and states with agent-relative content consists es-
sentially in a certain causal-computational role of this name, and it is an important element in 
his account. At the same time, Al’s internal name of Al is used, by Al, in order to represent Al 
as occurring in the representational contents of others’ states. So the internal name plays two 
important roles at the same time. Now, however, the question is which role explains what. 
And given the difference with respect to informational constancy just pointed out, it seems 
clear that the situation is quite asymmetric. The causal-computational role explains reference 
and immunity, the role in social metacognition does not. If this is so, we have to conclude that 
the origin of the first-person representation lies in the system’s own representational states 




The following diagnosis seems plausible. It is not an accident that the connection to 
proprioception and egocentric perception occurs in Beckermann’s theory. This part is doing 
the explanatory work, for the explanation of reference and immunity. Once we have that work 
done, the first-person concept can be recruited for some other task, such as the task of social 
metacognition and theory of mind. But Beckermann commits a mistake if he locates the origin 
of self-consciousness in social metacognition. It is another and distinct part of his overall the-
ory which explains self-consciousness – or, at least, could provide the basic material for such 
an explanatory account. The origin of self-consciousness lies in whatever accounts for refer-
ence and immunity, if it lies anywhere at all. Al can begin “to see himself through the eyes of 
others”, but only if, and since, Al already possesses self-consciousness.33  
Finally, let us take a look at a possible argument in defense of Beckermann. Becker-
mann might suggest that his goal was to explain self-consciousness in so far as it is necessary 
for dealing with a certain task; for other tasks, representations with agent-relative contents are 
sufficient. Therefore, self-consciousness has its ‘origin’ in social metacognition. Or so Beck-
ermann might claim. 
This argument fails, however, and it fails for two reasons. First of all, what is claimed 
within this argument is not correct, viz., that a self-conscious representation of Al is only nec-
essary when it comes to social metacognition. And secondly, even if this were correct, it 
would not improve the situation with respect to the question of how we can explain the de-se 
character of the first-person concept. An explanation of immunity and reference would still be 
lacking. We would still not understand how Al’s representation of Al could be self-conscious. 
Let us argue for these two points in the following. 
Firstly, the argument in defense of Beckermann contains a false claim. The claim is that 
a self-conscious representation of Al is only necessary when it comes to social metacognition. 
To see why this claim is false, one has to consider the issue of the form or format of represen-
tation, i.e., of the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual content. Arguably, pro-
prioception and egocentric perception have non-conceptual content, whereas thoughts and 
other propositional attitudes possess conceptual content. We take it as an empirically well-
established fact about human cognition that perception (including proprioception and imagery) 
is processed in a way which is quite different from the way in which conceptual categoriza-
tions are processed. The best explanation for this is the assumption that they differ in the form 
or format of representation. If this is so, the need for acquiring a first-person concept is al-
                                                            
33 Beckermann (2003, 184). 
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ready in place when it comes to information about the system’s own bodily state (propriocep-
tion) and the agent-relative roles of objects in the system’s environment (egocentric percep-
tion). The proprioceptive and perceptual states are not suitable for thought, since they do not 
have the requisite kind of form or character – they are not concept involving. Therefore, if one 
accepts a distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual representation and assigns non-
conceptual content to proprioception and egocentric perception, Beckermann’s argument fails. 
Even if all the information is already contained in these non-conceptual states, a first-person 
concept is needed in order to bring it into the realm of thinking (with all its inferential capaci-
ties and processing). Al not only wants to (proprioceptively) perceive the pain in his left knee. 
Al also wants to be able to think that there is a pain in his left knee. Therefore, Al needs a 
first-person concept. Without such a concept Al’s thinking would be ‘blind’ to the infor-
mation contained in his perceptual states.34  
Beckermann could resist this counter-argument by rejecting the distinction between 
conceptual and non-conceptual representation. (We believe that this would be a rather desper-
ate move.) But even then his argument would not succeed. For, consider egocentric contents 
in perception. These perceptual states represent agent-relative properties of objects in Al’s 
environment. For example, a red apple is represented as red and as being-one-meter-in-front-
of-Al. The spatial feature of the apple is represented en bloc, as it were. But certainly, Al not 
only wants to represent apples as having spatial locations relative to Al. He also wants – and 
needs – to represent apples as standing in the very same spatial relations to other objects. 
Therefore, Al needs a representation of the spatial relation being-one-meter-apart-from, and 
not only of the impure spatial property of being-one-meter-in-front-of-Al. And then he needs 
an explicit representation of Al in order to apply the former representation of the spatial rela-
tion, if he wants to represent Al as standing in this relation to some other object. Of course, 
whether Al ‘needs’ a certain representation depends on the tasks Al is supposed to solve. So 
‘needing’ a kind of representation is relative. But it seems quite clear that the ‘need’ for a rep-
resentation of spatial relations (and not just of impure, agent-relative spatial properties) is 
quite strong, since it allows for a much more general application which is useful for a poten-
tially unlimited number of cases. (Of course, many inferential relations will become accessi-
                                                            
34 The distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content has by now become very wide-spread. It can be 
drawn and explained in various different ways, e.g., by reference to maplike vs. sentence-like representation 
(Tye) or analog vs. digital representation (Dretske), etc. It does not matter for the present purposes which of 
these further developments or explanations one favors, all we need is the distinction itself. It does also not matter 
whether the distinction concerns the contents or the representations (representational vehicles) or both. 
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ble only by having the complex representation, comprising two singular representations of the 
objects and a representation of the spatial relation. Only then will many logical relations be-
come ‘visible’.)35  
If, on the other hand, Beckermann wanted to insist that the ‘need’ for a self-
representation that comes from the task(s) of social metacognition is strict and absolute, we 
have to respond that, on reflection, this is not really true. In principle, one could represent 
others’ mental states concerning oneself in an en-bloc fashion, in the same way in which ego-
centric representations represent the spatial facts in an en-bloc fashion. For example, Al 
would represent some other cognitive system as having the property of representing-Al-as-
friendly. Of course, such a way of representing social mental facts would be vastly impracti-
cal, perhaps to the point of being no longer computationally manageable. (The range of appli-
cation would not be general, as one can put it.) But in principle such a way of representing 
these facts is possible. So even there the ‘need’ is not strict or absolute. 
Now, let us move on to our second point. We submit that even if the claim that we have 
just criticized were correct, this would not improve the situation concerning the explanation of 
the de-se character of self-conscious representations. Suppose that Al needed an explicit rep-
resentation of Al for the task of social metacognition. This would not show, however, how 
this representation gets the two crucial features of reference and immunity. It could still be the 
case that what explains these features is something quite different from the role in social met-
acognition; and in particular, it could still be the case that what explains these features is a 
causal-computational role vis à vis proprioception and egocentric perception. Therefore, we 
have to conclude that Beckermann does not explain self-consciousness by means of social 
metacognition – even if the claim that we argued against above were correct. The explanation 







                                                            
35 Just to mention another ‘need’ for an explicit self-representation, the use of spatial cognitive maps seems to 
require an element suitable for marking the system’s own position (real or imagined) within its map. 
36 Many thanks for valuable comments and points of criticism to Ansgar Beckermann, Hanspeter Mallot, Mark 
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